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UNDUE PROCESS: A FATHER’S PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN 
AN EMBRYO AND ITS CLASH WITH CASEY  
Anthony Jose Sirven* 
Abstract 
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the United States 
Supreme Court respectively held that it is unconstitutional to require a 
mother to seek consent from or to notify the father before she has an 
abortion. Fathers thus lost consent and notification rights. However, 
courts have recently begun to recognize a property interest in human 
embryos. This legal trend—resulting from the widespread use of assisted 
reproductive technology—could allow fathers to claim that the abortion 
of their unborn children violates the Due Process Clause, which protects 
people from being deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”  
A conflict thus arises between Casey’s holding and the due process 
rights fathers are entitled to in the context of abortion. This Note reviews 
cases that have found property and property-like interests in embryos, as 
well as due process jurisprudence regarding property interests. This Note 
argues that since embryos have been deemed property, fathers have 
grounds for challenging abortions as unconstitutional deprivations of 
their property interest without “due process of law.” Yet, since due 
process rights for fathers in the abortion context would essentially 
guarantee the very thing the Casey decision denied fathers, this Note 
argues that the Supreme Court should reexamine its holding in Casey to 
balance the two conflicting Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,1 and later in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 the United States 
Supreme Court held that fathers need not consent to, or be notified of, the 
abortion of their unborn child. The Court deemed such restrictions an 
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion.3 Fathers lost 
consent and notification rights ever since. However, courts have recently 
begun to recognize property interests in human embryos. This trend could 
allow fathers to claim that the abortion of their unborn children violates 
the Due Process Clause, which states that no person shall be deprived of 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”4   
The legal status of embryos as property would confer upon fathers due 
process rights that could protect them from being deprived of their 
property via an abortion. Yet, allowing fathers due process rights in the 
abortion context conflicts with Casey because it would guarantee fathers 
precisely what Casey denies: the right to notice and an opportunity to be 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (striking a spousal consent statute as an impermissible restriction 
on abortion rights). 
 2. 505 U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992) (striking a spousal notification statute as an “undue 
burden” on abortion rights). 
 3. Id. at 895.  
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. As an aside, the focus of this Note is only on due process 
rights that stem from law that regards embryos as property. This Note does not seek here to support 
the proposition that embryos should be regarded as property—to the contrary, the Author 
maintains embryos should be afforded full personhood status. Nevertheless, the development of 
recent case law would seemingly entitle procedural due process protections to fathers who want 
to prevent the abortion of their unborn child on the grounds of a property interest. 
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heard.5 Therefore, Casey should be reexamined to address this conflict 
between two Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
This Note argues that fathers living in the post-Casey world may be 
entitled to constitutional rights that Casey instructs states to deny. To 
demonstrate this conflict, Part I of this Note examines how fathers’ due 
process rights in the abortion context would create a tension with the 
Casey decision. Part II explains how the widespread use of assisted 
reproductive technology has led to case law establishing property 
interests in embryos. Part III explains how the Due Process Clause 
provides basic procedural rights that protect people from being deprived 
of their property unfairly. Lastly, Part IV revisits how granting fathers 
due process rights would conflict with Casey and explains why the 
Supreme Court should address this tension.  
I.  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FATHERS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN AN 
ABORTION AND CASEY 
Fathers’ due process rights in the abortion context are based on laws 
that deem human embryos, directly or indirectly, to be property.6 
Although human embryos are not typically thought of as property, the 
word “property” in the Due Process Clause has been interpreted broadly 
to cover proprietary interests that are also not ordinarily thought of as 
property. For example, government jobs, a deceased kin’s body parts, and 
welfare payments—things not usually understood as property—have 
been deemed protected “property” interests under the Due Process 
Clause.7 As this Note demonstrates in Parts II and III, a developing body 
of case law has deemed embryos property, and wherever a property 
interest lies, due process protects it.  
In short, the Due Process Clause guarantees individuals certain 
substantive and procedural rights. The most basic procedural rights due 
process assures are notice and an opportunity to be heard.8 But in the 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–95; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313 (1950) (“[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that 
[a] deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity 
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”). 
 6. While many find the characterization of a frozen embryo as property disconcerting, 
scholars debate the merits of treating embryos as property, persons, or something in-between. See 
Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Proposed State 
Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 410–15 (2013) (discussing the various legal 
statuses of the frozen embryo). 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313–14; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For 
more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose 
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they 
must first be notified.’” (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863))). 
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abortion context, fathers are not—and in fact they cannot be—given that. 
Casey and its progeny have deemed any governmental requirement to 
provide a father with notice of or to ask for his consent to an abortion as 
being an unconstitutional undue burden.9 Therefore, after Casey, state 
actors, such as public medical facilities—and, more generally, state laws 
that adhere to Casey’s repudiation of fathers’ notice rights—participate 
in a system that deprives fathers of a property interest without affording 
them due process before their unborn child in the embryonic stage of life 
is aborted.10  
It is clear then that recognizing a father’s due process right in the 
abortion context would conflict with some aspects of a mother’s abortion 
right under Casey; namely, requiring that fathers be notified before an 
abortion would violate Casey’s ban on spousal notification laws. But by 
the same token, following Casey in this context would violate basic 
principles of due process with respect to the father’s interest. So what 
should be done about this conflict? Fittingly enough, the Casey majority 
answers that question, too. Indeed, the Casey majority addressed the 
principle of stare decisis, which requires a court to follow precedent, and 
stated that “[t]he obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, 
and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.”11 The Court cautioned, 
however, that precedent should be followed unless and until “a different 
necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to 
be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason 
doomed.”12  
For fathers in the abortion context, the “error” of Casey is that its 
enforcement may now “doom” their constitutional right to due process of 
law. This Note thus argues that, for the very reasons the Casey Court said 
                                                                                                                     
 9.  E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (“[Section] 3209 . . . will operate as a substantial obstacle 
to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion. It is an undue burden, and therefore invalid.”); 
Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (striking a spousal consent statute 
as an impermissible restriction on abortion rights). 
 10. The Due Process Clause only protects individuals from deprivations by the State. E.g., 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982). In the abortion context, public hospitals 
that perform abortions would be considered state actors against whom a father could bring his 
claim. More generally, state laws that allow for deprivations of property without due process can 
meet the requirements for state action. See, e.g., Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96 (holding that two state 
statutes “work[ed as] a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny 
the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor” by the 
State); Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking a state 
statute that allowed a public hospital to remove a deceased’s body parts without the kin’s consent 
or notice). Discussion of state actors is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on the 
theoretical implications of a father’s property interest in embryos and assumes a state actor in this 
context. 
 11. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
 12. Id. 
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that precedent should be reexamined, the Supreme Court should 
reexamine Casey.  
II.  PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMBRYOS 
The post-Casey conflict between a mother’s abortion right and a 
father’s due process right is based on embryos being recognized as 
“property.” But not all courts agree with this notion. The property/person 
dichotomy regarding the legal status of human embryos is one that 
continues to be debated,13 especially since how the law defines human 
embryos has significant implications.14 For example, the embryo’s status 
as property could mean fathers are entitled to due process in the case of a 
possible abortion, whereas the embryo’s status as a person would confer 
upon it a right to life that is primary, and its destruction would constitute 
a homicide.15 Either scenario would conflict with the mother’s abortion 
right in some respect. Deeming embryos property, however, may entail a 
lesser threat to abortion rights. This consideration perhaps explains why 
many lower courts have extended the embryos-as-property notion.16 
Regardless of the reasons courts have deemed embryos property instead 
of persons, examining the contexts where courts have done so is 
important for understanding this conflict. 
                                                                                                                     
 13. The moral, philosophical, and public policy concerns about deeming human embryos 
as property and the reasons for doing so are beyond the scope of this Note. This Note focuses only 
on the implications those cases have for fathers in the abortion context.  
 14. Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical Examination of the Resolution of 
Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 396–97 
(2005) (“[S]hould [a] court determine that the embryo is human life, its authority to direct the 
destruction of the embryo will be significantly limited. By contrast, a determination that the 
embryo is purely property provides the court and the progenitors with more latitude in arriving at 
possible options for disposition of the embryo.”).  
 15. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973) (stating that if “personhood is 
established, the appellant’s case [a woman seeking an abortion], of course, collapses, for the fetus’ 
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment”); see also Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that without the status of 
“person,” a fetus would not have a “right to life”); Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, 
Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 205 
(1997) (“If the law deems frozen embryos ‘persons,’ their damage would constitute criminal or 
tort assault, their destruction would be homicide . . . .”). 
 16. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 403 (“The legal status of ‘personhood’ would also arguably 
give the embryo its own protected rights. This could possibly have the effect of outlawing, or at 
least rendering impractical, the work of most IVF clinics. For these reasons, no other jurisdiction 
has adopted the approach followed by the Louisiana Legislature and characterized embryos as 
‘persons.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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A.  Problems Involving Leftover Embryos 
Science sometimes develops faster than the law. This is particularly 
true of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), principally in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), which enables people to have children who otherwise 
cannot.17 However, the widespread use of ART has provoked unintended 
consequences that have raised difficult legal questions—chiefly, what is 
the legal status of the human embryo?  
Although ART provides more people with the opportunity to conceive 
children, its use invites certain problems. Take IVF, for example. It 
presents health risks for patients18 and is very expensive.19 To deal with 
these concerns, IVF patients often create and keep multiple embryos 
frozen through a process known as cryopreservation.20 This technique 
increases parents’ overall chances of a successful live birth by allowing 
for more than one embryo to be used, minimizes health risks by reducing 
the invasiveness inherent in the procedure, and reduces the procedure’s 
costs.21 As a result, however, once an IVF patient successfully becomes 
pregnant, she will often have leftover embryos that are then stored and 
kept frozen indefinitely.22 Recent studies estimate there are over half a 
million cryopreserved embryos stored in the United States.23  
                                                                                                                     
 17. See In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (June 27, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic. 
org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/basics/why-its-done/prc-2001 8905?p=1.  
 18. See id. 
 19. The national average costs for an IVF procedure is about $12,000; however, it jumps to 
about $20,000 once other necessary costs are added. See Jennifer Gerson Uffalussy, The Cost of 
IVF: 4 Things I Learned While Battling Infertility, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2014, 3:00 PM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2014/02/06/the-cost-of-ivf-4-things-i-learned-while-
battling-infertility/. 
 20. See Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Note, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative 
Rights Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1381–
82 (1995). 
 21. See DEP’T OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER MED. CTR., IN VITRO 
FERTILIZATION (2015), https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/MediaLibraries/URMCMedia/fertility-
center/documents/In-Vito-Fertilization-4-29-15-updated.pdf.  
 22. See Laura Biel, What Happens to Extra Embryos After IVF?, CNN.COM (Sept. 2, 2009, 
12:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/extra.ivf.embryos/ (explaining that 
parents may have up to six leftover embryos after successfully having a child through IVF). 
Although embryos can be stored indefinitely, facilities charge between $300 and $1,200 a year to 
store embryos. Tamar Lewin, Industry’s Growth Leads to Leftover Embryos, and Painful Choices, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/embryos-egg-donors-
difficult-issues.html?_r=0.  
 23. E.g., Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A 
Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 378 (2013); Liza Mundy, Souls on Ice: 
America’s Embryo Glut and the Wasted Promise of Stem Cell Research, MOTHER JONES 
(July 2006), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-ice-americas-embryo-glut-and-
wasted-promise-stem-cell-research (calculating, based on a 2002 study, that there are over 
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Dealing with the growing population of leftover embryos is 
problematic because they have a vague status in the law. Given the 
embryos’ unclear legal status, those involved with an IVF procedure—
couples, doctors, and IVF clinics—are left in the dark, not knowing how 
to deal with the leftover embryos. This uncertainty raises difficult 
questions that have no clear answers: Should the clinic keep the embryos 
in storage indefinitely?24 Can the clinic donate the embryos? If the clinic 
negligently damages or loses the embryos, or simply refuses to return 
them,25 can the parents sue the clinic? On what legal grounds might they 
do so? Tort? Loss of property?26 Can the parents seek criminal charges 
against the clinic for kidnapping or homicide?27 The answers to these 
questions each depend on the embryos’ legal status.28  
These difficult questions illustrate why it is important to define an 
embryo’s legal status, so as to give parties involved with IVF, and ART 
generally, an understanding of their rights in the embryos and what 
liabilities and dangers they face. Courts deal directly with this issue when, 
for example, couples with leftover embryos seek a divorce,29 when one 
who owns frozen reproductive material dies,30 or when a couple reclaims 
its embryos from a clinic but the clinic refuses to return them31 or has 
destroyed, donated, or lost them.32  
                                                                                                                     
500,000 frozen embryos in the United States). There is such an excess of frozen embryos that the 
government has a campaign to spread awareness of their availability for adoption. See Embryo 
Adoption, OFF. POPULATION AFF., http://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa-and-initiatives/embryo-
adoption/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 24. IVF clinics would be required to keep the embryos in storage indefinitely if embryos 
are granted personhood status. If the embryo is defined as a person, the disposing of the embryos 
would constitute homicide and the IVF enterprise would likely be outlawed or rendered 
impractical. See Upchurch, supra note 14, at 403 & n.44 (“This [personhood] status could hamper 
the work of IVF clinics because it could require IVF clinics to provide storage for the embryos 
indefinitely. Also, the IVF clinic could arguably be subject to lawsuits brought by the guardians 
of the embryos if the embryo is damaged, wrongfully implanted in another person, or disposed of 
by the clinic.”). 
 25. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 423–25 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that a clinic must 
return a couple’s embryos under bailment law). 
 26. See Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9–
10 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002) (allowing a plaintiff to advance an argument for recovery for 
damages for emotional distress based on the loss of irreplaceable property). 
 27. See Guzman, supra note 15, at 205. 
 28. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 396 (“Under an adversarial model, the court must assign a 
legal status to the embryo. Such a determination is imperative, as it will determine the progenitors’ 
and the court’s authority over the embryo and dictate the possible options for resolution of the 
dispute.”). 
 29. E.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 177 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 
589 (Tenn. 1992); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 264 (Wash. 2002).  
 30. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 31. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 423–25 (E.D. Va. 1989).  
 32. See Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784, at *1–
2 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002).  
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These ordinary, real-life situations often provoke ligation that requires 
courts to decide an embryo’s legal status to resolve the dispute. Doing so, 
however, puts courts in an uncomfortable position. Courts have 
inconsistently defined the legal statuses of embryos,33 and in fact the 
determination may invite moral and philosophical considerations that go 
well beyond their expertise.34 Yet, for better or worse, some courts have 
tended to apply property law in cases involving reproductive materials 
and cryogenically preserved embryos.  
B.  Sperm as Property 
Courts have recognized a property interest in one’s own genetic and 
reproductive material.35 A principal case is Hecht v. Superior Court,36 in 
which Mr. Kane, the decedent, had deposited fifteen vials of his sperm at 
a California sperm bank.37 There he signed a “Specimen Storage 
Agreement” giving his partner, Ms. Hecht, control over the sperm in the 
event of his death.38 A few days later, Mr. Kane executed a will 
bequeathing all “right, title, and interest” in the sperm to Ms. Hecht and 
wrote a letter stating his desire that Ms. Hecht use the sperm to become 
pregnant, should she so choose.39 Several weeks later, Mr. Kane sent a 
letter to both his actual and potential children (those who would be born 
from his sperm) declaring his love and affection for them.40 A week after 
penning the letter, he committed suicide.41  
 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See Guzman, supra note 15, at 197 (discussing the confusing and inconsistent legal 
framework surrounding the rights and status of frozen reproductive material); see also Upchurch, 
supra note 14, at 397 (“While the adversarial model promotes such determinations, courts have 
been unable to articulate a status for the embryo that provides for a workable solution to the 
dispute while simultaneously preserving respect for the unique attributes of the embryo.”).  
 34. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (“We need not resolve the difficult question 
of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of 
man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”); Dehmel, supra note 20, at 
1378 (arguing that when courts determine whose wishes should prevail in cases involving the 
disposition of frozen embryos, they must consider questions that, “[f]ar from the detached 
methods of science which necessitate them . . . , spawn highly charged inquiries into complex 
legal, philosophical, and emotional issues”). 
 35. See generally Jennifer Long Collins, Note, Hecht v. Superior Court: Recognizing a 
Property Right in Reproductive Material, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 661, 662–63 (1995) 
(analyzing the Hecht decision and reasons for recognizing property rights in sperm). 
 36. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  
 37. Id. at 276.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 276–77.  
 40. Id. at 277.  
 41. Id. 
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After the suicide, Ms. Hecht and Mr. Kane’s children fought over Mr. 
Kane’s frozen sperm.42 The children requested that the sperm be 
destroyed or, alternatively, that it be distributed to them.43 They argued 
that they wished to “guard the family unit” by preventing the birth of 
children who would never meet their father or “have the slightest hope of 
being raised in a traditional family,” and they wanted to “prevent the 
disruption of [their] existing famil[y],” which would suffer “additional 
emotional, psychological and financial stress.”44 Ms. Hecht responded 
that neither the estate nor the children had a property interest in the sperm, 
because it was gifted to her at the time that it was deposited in the sperm 
bank as either an inter vivos gift or a gift causa mortis.45  
California’s Second District Court of Appeal agreed with Ms. Hecht 
and ruled in her favor.46 The court stated the law provided the decedent 
with a transferrable property right.47 The court found that 
at the time of [Mr. Kane’s] death, decedent had an interest, 
in the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decision 
making authority as to the sperm within the scope of policy 
set by law. Thus, decedent had an interest in his sperm which 
falls within the broad definition of property in Probate Code 
section 62, as “anything that may be the subject of ownership 
and includes both real and personal property and any interest 
therein.”48  
Accordingly, the court recognized a valid property interest in 
Mr. Kane’s sperm and held it was properly part of his estate.49 
By recognizing ownership rights to human genetic material, the Hecht 
decision essentially extended personal property rights to human 
reproductive material and in so doing rejected public policy concerns 
about ownership of human reproductive material.50 And although Hecht 
may be viewed as a drastic decision by some,51 perhaps more far-reaching 
are cases that have recognized property rights in human embryos. 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 278.  
 43. Id. at 278–79. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 280, 291. 
 47. Id. at 281.  
 48. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 49. See id. at 283, 291.  
 50. See id. at 280–81. 
 51. But cf. Collins, supra note 35, at 673 (stating that the Hecht decision simply clarified 
existing law).  
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C.  Embryos as Property 
York v. Jones52 was one of the first cases to find a property interest in 
an embryo. In that case, a married couple, the Yorks, contracted to 
undergo IVF to help them have a child.53 Soon after this, the Yorks 
decided to move to California.54 Before moving, they requested that their 
embryos, which were being kept at the Jones Institute in Virginia, be 
transferred to a California clinic so that they could complete the IVF 
procedure there.55 However, the Jones Institute refused to send the Yorks’ 
embryos to California.56 The Yorks then sued the Jones Institute, 
claiming they were entitled to the embryos.57  
Applying bailment law, the court found the clinic, as a bailee, had a 
duty to return the embryos to the Yorks as they were the rightful owners.58 
Moreover, the court also found the “plaintiffs ha[d] properly alleged a 
cause of action in detinue,” which requires, among other things, “a 
property interest in the thing sought to be recovered . . . .”59  
In short, the York court, without explicitly defining the embryos as 
property, found a property interest in human embryos by applying 
bailment law—a common law property principle. And by applying 
property law, the court recognized the Yorks indeed had an ownership 
interest in their embryos.60 Therefore, York plainly recognized a personal 
property interest in human embryos.61 
Discussion of York’s implications and the person/property embryo 
dichotomy is abundant.62 For instance, Professor Angela Upchurch 
explains that York’s finding of a property interest in embryos was not too 
shocking given that IVF consent forms often contain divorce provisions 
that characterize the embryos as the “marital property” of the parents.63 
                                                                                                                     
 52. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 53. Id. at 423–24. 
 54. Id. at 423. 
 55. Id. at 424. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 422–24.  
 58. Id. at 425. 
 59.  Id. at 427 (emphasis added). 
 60. See id. at 425. 
 61. See id. at 425–27. 
 62. See, e.g., Upchurch, supra note 14, at 396–97, 401; see also Jessica Berg, Owning 
Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
159, 207–08 (2005) (arguing courts are applying a property framework to disputes over embryos, 
even though they are unwilling to frame the arguments in those terms); Guzman, supra note 15, 
at 197–98 (noting the disparate ways embryos are characterized across disciplines); Shelly R. 
Petralia, Note, Resolving Disputes over Excess Frozen Embryos Through the Confines of Property 
and Contract Law, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 106 (2002–2003) (discussing the ways courts attempt 
to frame the issue in embryo-dispute cases). 
 63. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 401. 
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These consent forms, therefore, demonstrate that the York position is 
shared—or at least comprehended—by those who undergo IVF. 
Professor Upchurch, however, also cautions that characterizing 
embryos as property would imply embryo disputes should be resolved 
using traditional contract and property law principles.64 She claims this 
characterization would render irrelevant any argument that parties have 
interests in the embryo because of their potential to become born 
persons.65 Professor Upchurch maintains some courts are unwilling to 
label embryos as property for that reason.66 Yet, despite these concerns, 
many courts have done exactly that. 
Another case that explicitly deemed embryos property was Frisina v. 
Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island.67 There, a couple sued a 
hospital for “loss of irreplaceable property,” claiming that the hospital 
had destroyed their embryos.68 However, the hospital moved for 
summary judgment arguing in part that there was no precedent in Rhode 
Island allowing the award of damages “for emotional distress from the 
loss of [embryo] property based on breach of contract or negligence.”69  
The court explained that “while courts have not considered pre-
embryos persons within the meaning of the law, they have been deemed 
‘property’ of progenitors,” or the progenitors are deemed to at least have 
an ownership-like interest in the embryos.70 Accordingly, the court found 
“merit in the argument raised by plaintiffs that recovery for damages for 
emotional distress based on the ‘loss of irreplaceable property,’ the loss 
of their pre-embryos, [was] permissible” and denied summary judgment 
on that claim.71 
The Frisnia and York cases plainly recognized the parents’ property 
interest in human embryos.72 They were not distinct in this regard; they 
were simply more explicit. But not all embryo ownership cases overtly 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; see also Howell, supra note 6, at 414 (“The majority of commentators and courts 
subscribe to or at least pay lip service to a conceptual middle ground between viewing the frozen 
embryo as human and viewing the frozen embryo as mere property. Most contend that the frozen 
embryo is an entity ‘entitle[d] . . . to special respect’ because it represents potential life. It is 
difficult, however, to define respect in this context.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992))). 
 67. No. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002). 
 68. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. at *8. 
 70. Id. at *9 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 
425 (E.D. Va. 1989)). 
 71. Id. at *10 (emphasis added).  
 72. See Howell, supra note 6, at 413–14 (“The court in York v. Jones applied the property 
approach . . . [by holding] that the clinic acted as bailee of the property and was under a legal duty 
to return it to the rightful owners.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
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recognize such interests.73 Some courts are apprehensive about deeming 
embryos property and tend instead to recognize embryo ownership—
either treating the embryo as property deserving “special respect” or 
implying ownership by applying contract law.74 
D.  Embryos as “Property-Like” 
Davis v. Davis75 is an example of a court hesitating to call embryos 
property but nevertheless recognizing the parents’ ownership interest in 
the embryos.76 There, a Tennessee couple used IVF to create seven 
cryopreserved embryos.77 The couple later divorced, which led them to 
litigate over the custody rights to the embryos.78 Mrs. Davis wanted to 
keep the embryos for herself in order to have children, but Mr. Davis 
wanted to keep the embryos stored because he was undecided about 
whether he wanted to be an unwed parent.79  
At trial, Mrs. Davis was awarded custody of the embryos.80 In turn, 
Mr. Davis appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision 
and ruled in favor of Mr. Davis, finding Mr. Davis had a constitutionally 
protected right not to have a child “where no pregnancy has taken 
place.”81 Disagreeing with that decision, Mrs. Davis appealed to the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, which granted review.82  
The Tennessee Supreme Court found that Mr. Davis was entitled to 
custody of the embryos.83 By referring to The American Fertility 
Society’s ethical standards, the court reasoned that the legal status of 
embryos “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special 
respect” and thus lie somewhere between property and human life.84 
Accordingly, the Court determined that Mr. and Mrs. Davis’s interest in 
their embryos was “not a true property interest . . . , [but that] they do 
have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have 
decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos.”85  
 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Courts are often uncomfortable with treating human embryos as mere property and 
often describe it falling within a middle ground between property and a human life. See id. at 414. 
  74. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).  
 75. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).   
 76. See id. at 597–98. 
 77. Id. at 589. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 590.  
 83. See id. at 604. 
 84. Id. at 596–97.  
 85. Id. at 597 (emphasis added). 
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Interestingly, the Davis court tiptoed around the question of whether 
embryos are mere property by stating that the embryos deserve “special 
respect” and that the Davises did not have a “true property interest” in 
them.86 Still, putting the “special respect” language to the side, the Davis 
court nevertheless recognized the Davises had an interest in the 
ownership of the embryos and thereby recognized a property—or at least 
a “property-like”87—interest in human embryos. Indeed, Professor 
Upchurch explains that, although Davis and other cases88 put embryos in 
this “property-like” middle category between property and human life, in 
reality those cases treat the embryos like property to resolve the dispute.89 
Therefore, Davis and cases applying the property-like category show 
another way that courts have recognized a property interest in embryos. 
E.  Embryo Ownership Enforced by Contract 
A third way that courts recognize a property interests in embryos is by 
contract. In Kass v. Kass,90 for instance, a married couple signed consent 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Id.; see also Upchurch, supra note 14, at 401 & n.31 (stating that “courts are reluctant 
to characterize embryos as mere property under the law”). 
  87. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 404–05 (explaining that Davis and cases like it “support[] 
the view of the embryo as property-like” because they treat “the embryo more as property than as 
a person” by allowing for them to be donated for research and by allowing “the progenitors [to] 
freely contract for sole control over the embryo” (emphasis added)). 
 88. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“[P]re-embryos 
occupy an interim category between mere human tissue and persons because of their potential to 
become persons. Accordingly, such embryos are due varying degrees of special respect dependent 
on the issue involved.” (emphasis added)). 
 89. See Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 2107, 2123 & n.102 (2007) (“In acknowledging the progenitors ownership interests 
and ability to dispose of the embryo in any manner consistent with the law, the court in Davis, 
ultimately treated the embryo like property despite holding it was entitled to special respect.”); 
see also Berg, supra note 62, at 211–12 (“Although it may seem tempting to talk about these 
entities as if they are neither persons nor property but a new special category, such terminology 
does little by itself to advance the legal analysis or provide a helpful framework for evaluation. In 
fact, the courts that seem to choose this route merely note the embryo’s ‘special’ status, but then 
revert to precepts of property law to resolve the dispute.” (footnote omitted)); Beth E. Roxland & 
Arthur Caplan, Should Unclaimed Frozen Embryos Be Considered Abandoned Property and 
Donated to Stem Cell Research?, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 108, 115 (2015) (“Even where a court 
makes explicit statements regarding the status of the embryo (i.e., person, property or entity 
deserving of special respect), there is often a disconnect between the court’s general 
characterization of embryos and the ordered disposition of the embryos at issue. Several opinions 
that initially declare it inappropriate to categorize embryos as property ultimately order that the 
embryos be thawed or destroyed in the course of research—remedies that arguably treat the 
embryos more like property than persons.”).  
 90. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).   
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forms to undergo IVF.91 They later sought a divorce.92 Before deciding 
to divorce, however, the couple had unsuccessfully tried IVF nine times 
and had five leftover cryopreserved pre-zygotes.93 Like the couple in 
Davis, Mrs. Kass wanted the right to use these pre-zygotes in another IVF 
procedure while Mr. Kass did not.94 This disagreement sparked litigation 
over the rights to the pre-zygotes.95 
Ultimately, the court denied the pre-zygotes personhood status and 
upheld the signed IVF consent forms.96 The court explained that one 
approach to deciding the issue is to “regard the progenitors as holding a 
‘bundle of rights’ in relation to the pre-zygote that can be exercised 
through joint disposition agreements.”97 Here, the agreement provided 
that the embryos would be donated to an IVF program if the parties could 
not agree on the disposition of the zygotes.98 So, to resolve the case, the 
court enforced the contract and let Mr. Kass donate the embryos to an 
IVF research program.99  
Kass shows that the existence of a contract allows courts to punt on 
the issue of whether embryos are property, property-like and entitled to 
“special respect,” or persons. Given the existence of a written agreement, 
a court may simply enforce the contract, thus implying ownership rights 
in the embryos that allow for their donation.100  
Litowitz v. Litowitz101 provides yet another example of a court 
upholding a contract implying embryo ownership.102 In this case, a 
married couple received eggs from a donor.103 The couple fertilized the 
eggs with the husband’s sperm to create five pre-embryos.104 After the 
birth of a daughter through a surrogate, the couple was left with two 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 176.  
 92. Id. at 177. 
 93. Id. at 175–77. 
 94. Id. at 177. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 179–80. 
 97. Id. at 179. 
 98. Id. at 181. 
 99. Id.; see also Berg, supra note 62, at 161 (“[Kass] rejected the ‘interim category’ 
approach and stated that progenitors hold a ‘bundle of rights’ in their frozen embryos.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 100. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182; see also Upchurch, supra note 89, at 2124 (arguing that 
although the Kass court attempted to avoid “the morass of confusion” regarding the legal status 
of an embryo, it nonetheless “implicitly gave the disputed embryo a property-like status”).  
 101. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).  
 102. Id. at 273–74. 
 103. Id. at 262. 
 104. Id.  
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cryopreserved embryos.105 They later divorced,106 after which the ex-wife 
sought to “implant the remaining preembryos in a surrogate mother and 
bring them to term.”107 The ex-husband did not want to have a child with 
her and instead wanted to put the embryos up for adoption.108 This 
disagreement spilled into the courtroom.109 
The court acknowledged that the husband and wife had equal rights to 
the pre-embryos—even though the wife was not a progenitor of the pre-
embryos like in Kass or Davis—due to the donor contract.110 The court, 
however, looked solely to the cryopreservation contract the couple signed 
and ordered the pre-embryos thawed and disposed of in accordance with 
the contract.111 In deciding the case by interpreting the contractual 
agreement, the court avoided the “legal, medical or philosophical 
discussion [about] whether the preembryos in this case are ‘children’” or 
not.112 By referring only to contract and property principles, the ruling 
supports Professor Upchurch’s claim that deeming embryos property 
allows courts to mechanically apply common law principles to embryo 
ownership disputes without giving significance to the embryos’ potential 
to be born persons.113  
As with the property-like category, Professor Upchurch maintains the 
“resolution of the embryo dispute under principles of contract law 
necessitates a property-based view of the legal status of the embryo.”114 
The reason for this, she argues, is that parents cannot contract away child 
visitation rights if the agreement is not in the child’s best interest, but 
potential parents can contract for one parent to receive sole control of an 
embryo or for an embryo to be donated for research. Moreover, courts do 
not oversee the disposition of the embryos the way they oversee child 
custody agreements.115 These differences demonstrate that courts treat 
embryos like property in order to enforce contracts.116  
                                                                                                                     
 105. Id. at 262–63. 
 106. Id. at 264. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 267. 
 111. Id. at 271. 
 112. Id.  
 113. See supra Section II.C.  
 114. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 406; see also Alexia M. Baiman, Cryopreserved Embryos 
as America's Prospective Adoptees: Are Couples Truly “Adopting” or Merely Transferring 
Property Rights?, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 134 n.7 (2009) (“In order for genetic 
parents to lawfully contract away their ownership rights to their embryos, the excess 
cryopreserved embryos must first be deemed to be their property. If embryos are deemed to be 
property rather than legally recognized ‘persons,’ either contract or property law could govern the 
transfer.”). 
 115. Upchurch, supra note 14, at 405. 
 116. Id. at 406.  
 
15
Sirven: Undue Process: A Father's Proprietary Interest in an Embryo and I
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1484 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
F.  Embryo Property in the Abortion Context 
These cases establish that human embryos can be owned. Some cases 
demonstrate this by explicitly applying property law,117 others by 
acknowledging property-like interests,118 and others by applying contract 
law.119 Ultimately, these cases acknowledge an ownership-like interest in 
embryos—particularly on behalf of those whose genetic material created 
the embryos. 
Under this case law, a father, as a progenitor, has a proprietary interest 
in an embryo. Thus, a father who wants to protect himself from being 
deprived of this property via an abortion should be entitled to the due 
process rights that the Constitution promises him. A challenge in such a 
case, however, is that in the abortion context courts might be 
apprehensive to extend property rights to an embryo in vivo, i.e., one 
inside the womb. But distinguishing embryos in vitro from those in vivo 
would be problematic.  
First, courts finding that progenitors have a property interest in their 
embryos did not do so because of where the embryos were located; rather, 
those courts recognized the progenitors’ property interest in the embryos 
because the embryos contained their genetic material. Second, due to the 
person/property dichotomy, granting property status to an embryo in vitro 
but not to an embryo in vivo inevitably invites granting the in vivo 
embryo personhood status—something courts have avoided as it would 
call into question the legality of abortion altogether. Third, as discussed 
in Part III, the Due Process Clause may protect a proprietary interest 
despite embryos not being recognized as property by state law. For these 
reasons, courts may be unwilling to distinguish between embryos in vitro 
and embryos in vivo; moreover, such a distinction is not determinative of 
whether embryos are property for the purposes of due process. In sum, a 
father in the abortion context, especially in jurisdictions that deem 
embryos property, should be entitled to a proprietary interest in an 
embryo in vivo, and that property interest entitles him to constitutional 
due process rights.  
III.  PROPERTY AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution protect people from being deprived of their “life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.”120 As mentioned above, due 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See supra Section II.B. 
 118. See supra Section II.C. 
 119. See supra Section II.D. 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.1 (5th ed. 2012). 
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process has procedural and substantive elements. Procedural due process 
protects people against state deprivations121 of life, liberty, or property by 
requiring “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections.”122  
However, a prerequisite for due process protection with regard to 
property is demonstrating the existence of a “property” interest 
recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.123 In 
fact, only certain types of “property” are protected under the Due Process 
Clause. Thus, to qualify for due process protection of property, a person 
must have the type of property the Constitution protects. In the due 
process context, however, the concept of property can be quite broad.  
A.  “Property” Under the Due Process Clause 
“[T]he property interests protected by procedural due process extend 
well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.”124 The 
Supreme Court made this clear in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, when it established that the Due Process Clause protects “property” 
interests derived from independent sources such as state law.125 Roth 
involved a state university professor who sued the school for not rehiring 
him,126 claiming the school’s decision not to rehire him violated his 
Fourteenth Amendment right by depriving him of property without due 
process of law.127 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 122. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950). The legendary 
Justice Story, describing due process rights (although in the criminal context), stated that “[i]t is 
a rule, founded in the first principles of natural justice, that a party shall have an opportunity to 
be heard in his defence [sic] before his property is condemned . . . . If a seizure is made . . . so that 
the parties in interest have no opportunity of appearing and making a defence [sic], the sentence 
is not so much a judicial sentence, as an arbitrary sovereign edict.” Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 
3 F. Cas. 1184, 1187 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 
422, 434 (1982) (“[T]he State may not finally destroy a property interest without first giving the 
putative owner an opportunity to present his claim of entitlement.”); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 
U.S. 274, 280–81 (1876) (quoting Justice Story’s opinion in Bradstreet).  
 123. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 
886 (2000); see also Robert Michael Kline, Comment, Constitutional Law: Is There a Protected 
Interest in Protection (or Are Court Orders Merely Suggestions)?, 58 FLA. L. REV. 459, 460 
(2006) (“[T]he first element of a procedural due process claim that alleges a deprivation of 
property is the identification of a property interest. In cases involving tangible property, a property 
interest is usually easy to ascertain. When the property interest is not readily identifiable, however, 
procedural due process cases become more complicated.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 124. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972). 
 125. Id. at 577. 
 126. Id. at 566. 
 127. Id. at 568–69. 
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The Court explained that “[t]he requirements of procedural due 
process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”128 
Therefore, one must claim a deprivation of a “liberty” or “property” 
interest for the Due Process Clause to apply.129 The Court defined a 
property interest by stating:  
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must 
have more than an abstract need or desire for it . . . [and] 
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law—rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus welfare 
recipients ha[ve] a claim of entitlement to welfare payments 
that [are] grounded in the statute defining eligibility for 
them. . . .130  
As such, the Court clarified that as a welfare recipient’s “property” 
interest in welfare payments is created by statutory terms, the professor’s 
“property” interest in his employment was created by the terms of his 
appointment.131 The Court thus recognized that the professor did in fact 
have a “property” interest in his employment, which was protected under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.132 However, because 
the terms of the professor’s employment agreement automatically 
expired on a specific date, and did not provide for a renewal, he did not 
have an interest in his future employment and was thus not deprived of 
his property interest under the Due Process Clause.133 
Recently, the Supreme Court in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales134 
reaffirmed Roth’s definition of property but also added: 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at 569. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 577.  
 131. Id. at 578.  
 132. Id. at 578–79. 
 133. Id.; see also 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, § 17.5(a) (“A person has an 
entitlement-property interest in employment with the government if he has already received the 
position and applicable law guarantees him continued employment. However, . . . if one occupies 
a position that applicable law defines as terminable for any reason, that person can be discharged 
without the requirement of fair procedures.” (footnote omitted)). 
 134. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).  
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Th[e] determination [of property interests protected by the 
Due Process Clause], despite its state-law underpinnings, is 
ultimately one of federal constitutional law. “Although the 
underlying substantive interest is created by ‘an independent 
source such as state law,’ federal constitutional law 
determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 
‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”135 
Therefore, Gonzales allows for property interests to be recognized 
under the Due Process Clause even if those interests would not be 
recognized as property under state law.136 In other words, what is 
considered property under the Due Process clause can, but need not be, 
considered property under state law. 
Consistent with Gonzales and Roth, in the abortion context a father’s 
interest in his embryo could be protected under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of whether the state law defines 
his interest as one of property. As a matter of constitutional law, federal 
law—not state law—determines what interests are protected as property 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.137 Examples of this principle include 
cases finding Fourteenth Amendment property interests in one’s public 
employment138 and in one’s deceased child’s body parts,139 even though 
state law did not clearly define those interests as “property.”  
Accordingly, although only some jurisdictions explicitly consider 
parents’ interest in their embryo to be one of mere property while other 
jurisdictions deem it “property-like,” either scenario may entitle a father 
to due process rights. As long as state law, case law, or a court recognizes 
a father’s interest in his embryo as “property” under the Due Process 
Clause, then he has a right to not be deprived of his interest without due 
process of law.140 
B.  Property Rights to a Deceased Kin’s Body Parts 
A good example of due process rights attaching to an interest not 
regarded as “property” under state law—and that also involved rights to 
human material—is provided in the case of Newman v. 
Sathyavaglswaran.141 In brief, the Ninth Circuit held that parents had a 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at 756–57 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 
436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)).  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576–77. 
 139. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 140. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 756–57. 
 141. 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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property interest in their deceased children’s body parts.142 Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit found “next of kin” property interests are afforded 
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.143  
The facts of Newman involved parents who sued the coroner’s office 
for removing their deceased children’s corneas without providing them 
notice or asking for their consent after the children died.144 It was 
uncontested that the coroner’s actions were a deprivation under the laws 
of the state,145 but in his defense, the coroner argued the parents could not 
bring a due process claim because they did not have a property interest in 
their children’s bodies.146  
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reiterated Roth’s language, holding 
procedural due process protects property interests well beyond actual 
ownership of real estate or chattels and protects the “security of interest” 
already acquired.147 The court then looked to determine whether the 
coroner had deprived the parents of a property interest they, as parents, 
had acquired over their children’s bodies and whether that interest was 
protected under the Due Process Clause.148 To do so, the court defined 
property as “the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the 
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.”149 
Applying this definition of property, the Newman court found the 
parents, as next of kin, had a due process property interest in their 
deceased children’s bodies.150 And by removing the deceased children’s 
body parts and transferring them to others, “the coroner did not merely 
‘take a single “strand” from the “bundle” of property rights: it chop[ped] 
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand[,]’ [which] was a 
deprivation of the most certain variety.”151 Accordingly, the court held 
that the coroner deprived the Newmans of property without due process 
of law.152 In effect, the Ninth Circuit protected a property interest—here, 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Id. at 798. 
 143. Id. at 797–99. 
 144. Id. at 788. 
 145. Id. at 789. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 790. 
 148. Id. at 795.  
 149. Id. (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). The court 
further relied on Roth, stating a person must have more than an ‘“abstract need or desire,”’ but 
rather must have a ‘“legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”’ Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State 
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).   
 150. Id. at 796–97. 
 151. Id. at 798 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1989)). 
 152. Id.   
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in the children’s body parts—under the Fourteenth Amendment even 
though that same interest was not deemed property under state law.153 
C.  A Father’s Due Process Rights in the Abortion Context 
These cases demonstrate that an individual’s property is 
constitutionally protected from State deprivation under the Due Process 
Clause. As shown in Part II, there should be no doubt that embryos have 
been deemed property: they have been subject to contract, transfer, and 
division as marital property in a divorce.154 Progenitors who have a 
property interest in an embryo should thus be entitled to due process 
rights.  
This proposition is especially true in jurisdictions that explicitly deem 
embryos property by precedent, such as in the York and Frisnia cases, or 
by statute, since property interests protected by the Due Process Clause 
“are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law.”155 These jurisdictions have case law establishing a property interest 
in embryos, and the Due Process Clause should protect that interest.  
Moreover, as Roth and Newman showed, even when a state or its 
courts do not recognize a particular interest as property, that interest may 
still be recognized as property under the Due Process Clause. The Court 
has repeated that, despite the interest’s foundations in state law, 
determining whether property interests are protected by the Due Process 
Clause is a question of federal constitutional law.156 Therefore, even in 
jurisdictions that do not explicitly deem embryos property, and instead 
recognize a “property-like” or ownership interest in the embryos, such 
that parties may enter into a contract regarding the embryos—or even 
where a jurisdiction or state has not considered the issue at all, such as in 
Roth and in Newman—parents’ interest in their embryo may still be 
recognized as a property interest under the Due Process Clause.  
By having a proprietary interest in an embryo, fathers facing an 
abortion should be entitled to the due process rights the Constitution 
promises them: notice and an opportunity to be heard.157 In the abortion 
context, however, fathers are often not notified about, or afforded 
opportunity to voice protest against, the destruction of their protected 
property interest. But due process demands at least that. The problem is 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 789, 797. 
 154. See supra Part II.  
 155. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 546, 577 (1972). 
 156. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005). 
 157. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating that 
notice and hearings “must measure up to the standards of due process”).  
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that after the Danforth and Casey decisions,158 abortion statutes cannot 
require notice and an opportunity to be heard without being struck down 
as unconstitutional undue burdens on the mother’s abortion right.159 
Needless to say, even if fathers are constitutionally entitled to due process 
rights regarding their property interests in the abortion context, Casey has 
made it such that they cannot be given it.  
IV.  REVISITING THE CONFLICT WITH CASEY 
In Casey, the Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania statute 
requiring married women to notify their husbands before having an 
abortion was unconstitutional.160 The Court reasoned that spousal-
notification requirements would deter some women from having an 
abortion and thus constitute an “undue burden” on a woman’s exercise of 
her abortion right.161 But before striking down spousal notification 
requirements, the Court first had to address whether Roe, which 
established a woman’s right to an abortion under the “liberty” prong of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,162 was still good law.163  
A.  Overturning Stare Decisis 
The Casey majority began its opinion by stating that “[l]iberty finds 
no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”164 So to address the doubts about 
Roe and the calling for it to be overruled, the Court expounded on the 
principle of stare decisis.165 The Court explained that because “no judicial 
system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case 
that raised it,” stare decisis demands respect for prior cases.166 That is to 
say, legal consistency is important if the judicial system is to work for the 
benefit of society. At the same time, the Court stressed that following 
                                                                                                                     
 158. See supra Part I. 
 159. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (“[Spousal 
notification requirements] will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo 
an abortion. It is an undue burden, and therefore invalid.”).  
 160. Id. The statute at issue stated that  “no physician shall perform an abortion on a married 
woman . . . unless he or she has received a signed statement, which need not be notarized, from 
the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse that she 
is about to undergo an abortion.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3209(a) (1989). The statute also stated the 
statement must contain a notice that false statements are punishable by law. Id.  
 161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. 
 162.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54, 164 (1973).  
 163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46.  
 164. Id. at 843–44. 
 165. Id. at 853 (“[Doubts about] Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty 
we have given combined with the force of stare decisis.” (alteration in original)).  
 166. Id. at 854. 
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precedent is not an “inexorable command.”167 Rather, changes in society 
and in the law may require a court to break precedent when “a prior 
judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its 
enforcement was for that very reason doomed.”168 Thus, a Court must 
make “prudential and pragmatic considerations” to determine whether 
precedent should be followed.169  
The Court listed several factors to be considered in determining 
whether to follow precedent.170 One important consideration it listed was 
“whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to 
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”171 
Applying this principle to Roe, the Court then examined medical 
advancements that had allowed fetuses to reach viability sooner than was 
the case when Roe was decided.172  
For the Court, the medical advances since Roe ultimately had “no 
bearing on the validity of Roe’s central holding,” as it only changed the 
“point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate 
to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”173 The Court 
reasoned that simply because the State’s interest in a viable fetus 
originated sooner in the pregnancy did not, by itself, call into question the 
“soundness or unsoundness” of the Roe decision.174 Accordingly, the 
Court found there were no changes that rendered Roe’s central holding 
obsolete nor any that supported arguments for overruling it.175 But that 
may not be the case anymore. Indeed, since the time that the Supreme 
Court decided Casey, laws regarding the advancements in reproductive 
technologies have significantly changed the legal interests involved in an 
abortion.  
B.  Casey Must Be Reexamined 
Facts central to the soundness of Casey’s holding have significantly 
changed. A dominant concern in Casey was whether spousal notification 
rights are constitutional.176 However, the considerations needed to decide 
that question have changed significantly in light of a father’s proprietary 
interest in the embryo. As previously discussed, this interest would entitle 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 854–55. 
 171. Id. at 855. 
 172. Id. at 860. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 844, 887. 
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him to due process rights in the abortion context. This constitutional right 
was not factored into the Casey equation.177  
Indeed, the Court did not consider the legal changes allowing for a 
father’s potential due process right in the abortion setting. Therefore, the 
fathers’ competing right to notice and an opportunity to be heard was 
something the Casey Court did not consider. Yet due process rights are 
guaranteed in the text of the Constitution, and notice and an opportunity 
to be heard are the least that due process requires. So the fact that a father 
may have a property interest in the embryo that entitles him to procedural 
due process is undoubtedly a significant “fact [that] ha[s] so changed, or 
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification.”178 Had the Casey Court considered a father’s 
due process right in relation to the pregnancy, the Court would have likely 
balanced these competing interests differently.179 
Additionally, by balancing the mother’s abortion right against the 
state’s interest in the fetus’ potential personhood, the Casey decision 
demonstrates that the mother’s right to an abortion is not absolute.180 In 
fact, the Court determined that the State’s interest at viability “is 
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic 
abortions.”181 Conversely, before a fetus reaches viability, the State’s 
interest is deemed subordinate to the mother’s and any restriction on her 
abortion right would need to survive the Court’s undue burden test.182  
The Court thus struck a balance between the mother’s right and the 
State’s interest, and between the father’s interest and the mother’s liberty; 
yet the father’s potential due process rights were never placed on the 
Court’s scale. If Casey were being decided today, however, the Court 
would need to balance each competing interest involved in the abortion. 
The Court would thus have to account for the father’s due process right, 
which is currently at odds with its previous holding. This development 
would give rise to, as the Casey majority put it, a “necessity” to reexamine 
the Casey precedent itself because it would otherwise entail maintaining 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Id. at 895–98 (discussing a husband’s interest in his wife’s pregnancy and the well-
being of the fetus, but never considering the potential property interests a husband may have in a 
developing fetus).  
 178. Id. at 855.  
 179. See id. at 898. In discussing the competing interests between husband and wife, the 
Court describes the husband’s interest as one in the “potential life of the child,” while describing 
the wife’s interest as one of “liberty,” a constitutionally protected right. Id. If the Court recognized 
both interests as constitutionally protected, the balancing test may have garnered a different result. 
 180. Id. at 876 (“The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads 
to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.”).  
 181. Id. at 860.  
 182. Id. at 876. 
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two Constitutional rights that are currently in contradiction.183 Therefore, 
this tension between two constitutional rights robs Casey of “significant 
application or justification.”  
Lastly, as it stands, the Court has never addressed a father’s 
proprietary interest in the fetus. The Casey decision is therefore neither 
indicative of whether fathers indeed have due process rights in the 
abortion context nor of whether such rights would be subordinate to the 
mother’s abortion right. The possibility that fathers are entitled to due 
process in the abortion context raises doubts about Casey’s holding that 
fathers cannot be required to be given, among other things, notice of an 
abortion. And since the Casey Court felt it was necessary to address the 
“doubts” surrounding Roe and the statutory restriction of a non-textual 
right,184 the Court should have at least equal reasons to address doubts 
surrounding Casey and its renunciation of a textual right—a father’s due 
process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. But without 
reexamining Casey, questions about a father’s due process right and how 
it should be balanced against the mother’s abortion right will remain 
unanswered. These questions only add to the looming uncertainties 
covered in Part II. 
Ultimately, the law is trending toward deeming an embryo the 
property of its progenitors. As such, fathers should be entitled to due 
process rights that protect them from being deprived of property without 
due process of law. However, the Casey Court did not consider this or the 
resulting tension it created between two constitutionally protected rights. 
Given the changes, conflicts, and doubts involving the different interests 
and rights that must now be balanced in an abortion, the Supreme Court 
must reexamine its holding in Casey to determine whether a father’s 
proprietary interest in his embryos entitles him to due process rights and, 
if so, what process is due. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, as courts, legislatures, and individuals continue to—directly 
or indirectly—treat embryos as property, the tension between a mother’s 
abortion right and a father’s due process right will only become more 
pronounced. And, as this Note has shown, although the Constitution 
explicitly states that no person shall be deprived of “property, without 
due process of law,”185 until Casey is reexamined, fathers living in the 
post-Casey world may suffer exactly that. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 854. As stated above, Casey struck down spousal notification requirements for 
abortions but due process rights for a father would constitutionally entitle him to at least notice. 
See supra Section III.C. 
 184. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
 185. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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